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Abstract
Cooperative breeding occurs when individuals help raise the offspring of others. It is widely
accepted that help displayed by cooperative breeders emerged only after individuals’ ten-
dency to delay dispersal had become established. We use this idea as a basis for two inclusive-
fitness models: one for the evolution of delayed dispersal, and a second for the subsequent
emergence of helpful behaviour exhibited by non-breeding individuals. We focus on a territo-
rial species in a saturated environment, and allow territories to be inherited by non-breeding
individuals who have delayed dispersal. Our first model predicts that increased survivorship
and increased fecundity both provide an incentive to non-breeding individuals to delay dis-
persal, and stay near their natal territory for some period of time. Predictions from the first
model can be well understood by ignoring complications arising from competition among
relatives. Our second model shows that effects on relatives play a primary role in the ad-
vantage of helping. In addition, the second model predicts that increased survivorship and
fecundity promote the emergence of help. Together, our models lead us to conclude that the
emergence of cooperative-breeding systems is made easier by life-history features associated
with high survivorship and fecundity. We discuss the implications of our conclusions for
life-history-based hypotheses of cooperative breeding and social evolution.
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1. Introduction
In many cooperatively breeding species, subordinate individuals postpone or even forgo
their own reproduction in order to promote the reproductive success of the dominant individ-
uals who occupy breeding territories. Familiar examples include the Florida Scrub Jay (Aph-
elocoma coerulescens), and meerkats (Suricata suricatta) (Cockburn, 1998; Clutton-Brock,
2002). Uncovering the adaptive significance of the helpful behaviour displayed by these and
other cooperative breeders is key to understanding the evolution of animal societies more
broadly.
Attempts to explain the selective advantage of cooperative breeding have emphasized
a range of complementary influences (Emlen, 1994). Some have focused on the personal
fitness benefits of helping, such as delayed reciprocity (Wiley and Rabenold, 1984), and
territory inheritance (Stacey and Ligon, 1991). Others have focused on the indirect fitness
benefits of raising related but non-descendant offspring, especially as a response to various
environmental constraints (Skutch, 1961; Emlen, 1982a,b).
As plausible as the various explanations for cooperative breeding are, studies in the field
have failed to uncover a general effect of species’ ecology that is also consistent with the vari-
ety of theoretical predictions made (Arnold and Owens, 1998). Consequently, recent research
has looked more deeply into the specific life-history features that might promote coopera-
tive breeding (Arnold and Owens, 1998; Beauchamp, 2014). Efforts there have centred on
finding evidence, among cooperatively breeding species, for the predominance of similar “K-
selected” life-history traits. These traits include high survivorship and low fecundity—traits
that are thought to be advantageous in environmentally constrained populations, near car-
rying capacity. Unfortunately, empirical support for the existing life-history based theories
has also been mixed (Hatchwell and Komdeur, 2000).
Despite the lack of empirical support, it seems inappropriate to dismiss life-history-based
explanations for cooperative breeding outright, since they are theoretically underdeveloped.
That is to say, the explanations are based on generic ideas about life-history evolution, rather
than on models tailored for cooperatively breeding species. In this paper, we use simple, yet
reasonably comprehensive, models to capture the evolution of cooperative breeding, with the
goal of clearly assessing the influence of basic life-history on the origin of these systems.
Biologists have long agreed that the evolution of delayed dispersal of offspring from their
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natal site is an important first step in the establishment of cooperative-breeding systems
(Brown, 1974; Emlen, 1982a; Koenig et al., 1992; Hatchwell and Komdeur, 2000; Kokko
and Lundberg, 2001; Kokko and Ekman, 2002). Evidence also suggests that the evolution
of delayed dispersal preceded the emergence of helping in certain eusocial insects (Thorne,
1997). Our approach, therefore, is to separate an individual’s dispersal decision from its
decision to help, in contrast to many previous models (Motro, 1993; Pen and Weissing, 2000;
Leggett et al., 2012; McLeod and Wild, 2013; Wild and Koykka, 2014). We implement
this approach by constructing and analysing a model for the evolution of delayed dispersal
(Model I). Results from this model are then used to inform a second model for the evolution
of helping following establishment of delayed dispersal (Model II).
Biologists have also long recognized the importance of genetic relatedness among coop-
erative breeders (Emlen, 1982b; Brown, 1987). Unlike those who incorporate relatedness
into their theory as a fixed parameter (Kokko and Johnstone, 1999; Kokko et al., 2001), we
model relatedness as a function of species’ population dynamics, which ultimately depends
on life-history details. Furthermore, our consideration of relatedness is explicit and allows
for inbreeding within groups to build, and so our models differ from recent theoretical work
(Koykka and Wild, 2015).
Overall, our models predict that cooperative breeding is promoted as survivorship, or
fecundity (or both) is increased. We discuss the implications of our predictions in the final
section, paying particular attention to life-history based explanations of cooperative breeding
and the evolution of social insects.
2. Model I: Delayed-Dispersal
It is a challenge to build a simple model of the evolution of delayed dispersal, since
so many factors (both ecological and social) come into play (Kokko and Ekman, 2002).
Here, we concentrate on building a model that is tractable but still reflects key aspects of
relevant biological systems. As the reader will see, this has required us to sometimes balance
our interest in biological realism against our need for a set of assumptions that help to
keep our models mathematically tractable. For the reader’s convenience, we summarize all
mathematical notation introduced below in Table 1.
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2.1. Monomorphic Wild-type Population
We first consider a genetically monomorphic population of haploid individuals. This
“wild-type” population will serve as the backdrop against which we later measure the fitness
of mutant individuals. We assume a haploid genetic system because it is simple, and because
it mirrors a diploid system with additive interactions between alleles (Johnstone and Cant,
2008).
We track our model wild-type population in discrete time, observing it at the beginning of
each time period, e.g. season, year, generation (Figure 1). Each individual in this population
begins its life as one of b ≥ 2 offspring produced by the two dominant breeders occupying
one of a very large number of breeding territories. In keeping with our use of dominant
individuals as stand-ins for dominant males and females, respectively, we assume that an
offspring inherits all of its genetic material from one or the other dominant on its natal
territory, independently, with one-half probability.
As the reader will see, our decision to allow two dominant individuals on a territory
means that, in general, genetic lineages experience some degree of inbreeding. In turn, the
possibility of inbreeding implies that relatedness among family members is not fixed, but
rather can vary in a way that is influenced by the details of the life history. As we have
said, this approach to modelling relatedness has not been used by previous authors (e.g.
Kokko and Johnstone, 1999; Kokko et al., 2001; Wild and Koykka, 2014), even though it
reflects a key means through which life-history features can act to influence the evolution of
cooperative breeding.
Following birth, each individual offspring matures, and then does one of two things. With
probability z each remains on its natal territory, delaying dispersal for exactly one time period
in an attempt to compete locally for a breeding opportunity, should such an opportunity
arise. With probability 1−z each disperses from its natal territory and attempts to compete
non-locally for breeding opportunities, wherever these might arise. For convenience we will
refer to z as an individual’s “tendency to delay dispersal.” Those individuals who delay
dispersal we call “subordinates” as long as they are on their natal territory, in order to
distinguish them from the territory’s two dominant owners. Those who disperse we call
“dispersers.” For now, subordinate individuals offer no help to dominants.
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Figure 1: Cartoon depiction of the possible fate of individuals in our
models. Verbal descriptions of events are given in Section 2.1.
Subordinate route. An individual who delays its dispersal will compete for local breeding
opportunities when these arise. If sα is the survival rate of dominants, then, on average,
breeding opportunities arise on a given territory at the rate of 2(1−sα) per time period. That
is to say, breeding opportunites follow the death of a dominant. We assume subordinates, by
virtue of the fact that they are native to a territory, always outcompete dispersers for local
breeding opportunities. This reflects what is understood to be a key incentive for cooperative
breeding (Kokko and Lundberg, 2001; Kokko and Ekman, 2002; Wild and Koykka, 2014).
It should be emphasized that there are downsides to the priority access we afford sub-
ordinates. First, subordinates are not guaranteed to survive to compete for the local op-
portunities that may or may not arise. We use sβ to denote the probability with which a
subordinate survives to compete, and so 1 − sβ gives the probability with which a subor-
dinate dies before any local competition can occur. Second, subordinates compete against
one another on an equal footing (we assume no queuing of subordinates). Since subordinate
competitors are all native to a given territory they are genetically related. Consequently,
success as a subordinate may come at the expense of a relative, and we use c to denote the
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probability with which this occurs.
Conditioned on its survival, then, a subordinate competes successfully to become a dom-
inant with probability mα (or, equivalently, competes for mα breeding opportunities). Again
conditioned on survival, the same subordinate fails to compete successfully with probability
mβ = 1 −mα. In the latter case, it remains a subordinate until the following time period,
when it disperses, and so becomes a “disperser,” with probability 1 (see below). Complete
dispersal of subordinates is an assumption that allows us to keep the model simple (it allows
us to circumvent the need for classifying territories using a potentially large state space). It
is, however, also an assumption that is reflected in the delayed dispersal of the cooperative
breeding corvids like the Florida Scrub Jay (Brown, 1974), and the Gray Jay (Waite and
Strickland, 1997).
In Appendix A, we develop expressions for mα, mβ, and c when the wild-type population
has reached equilibrium, as it is the equilibrium population in which we later assume mutant
behaviour arises (see below, and also Taylor and Frank, 1996). This same assumption can
be found in other approaches to modelling behaviour (e.g. Geritz, 2005).
To emphasize the fact that mα, mβ, and c are calculated at equilibrium, we re-write them
as mˆα, mˆβ, cˆ, respectively. In Appendix A, we also develop an expression for the equilibrium
level of genetic relatedness between two offspring born on the same territory during the same
time period, denoted rˆ; i.e. relatedness between potential local competitors.
Disperser route. A disperser – either an individual who became a disperser immediately
following its birth, or an individual who had been a subordinate on its natal territory, but
then failed to secure a breeding opportunity there – competes for breeding opportunities
on territories other than the one on which it was born. We assume that each disperser
survives dispersal with probability sω, and, conditioned on its survival, expects to compete
successfully for nα breeding opportunities. In Appendix A, we provide an expression for nα
at equilibrium, and we write its equilibrium value as nˆα.
We make two technical assumptions in this part of our model. First, we assume that
dispersers cannot secure breeding opportunities in time periods other than the one in which
they disperse. This can be thought of, effectively, as assuming that a disperser who fails
to secure a breeding opportunity dies. Second, we assume that dispersers fill all dominant
positions not filled by subordinates. This means that, in principle, nα can exceed 1 (our
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model for competition uses a typical “sampling with replacement” scheme; see Appendix A).
More importantly, it also means that breeding habitat is saturated. In this way the model
incorporates ideas from early theory (Brown, 1974; Emlen, 1982a,b), as well as evidence from
cooperatively breeding birds in the field (Pruett-Jones and Lewis, 1990).
2.2. The Inclusive-Fitness Effect of Delayed Dispersal
To understand how selection acts to change the tendency to delay dispersal, we use a
version of Hamilton’s rule (Hamilton, 1964) that reflects the assumptions laid out above.
Specifically, we consider a mutant allele that increases the tendency of its immature carrier
to delay dispersal, and we develop an expression for the effect the allele has on its carrier’s
inclusive fitness. We stress that this inclusive-fitness effect is calculated under the assumption
that the population is at equilibrium, and that, relative to the wild-type, the mutant allele
changes the tendency to delay dispersal by a small amount only.
We use ∆w(z) to denote the inclusive-fitness effect of the mutant allele, where z now
reflects the population-wide average tendency to delay dispersal (Taylor and Frank, 1996).
When ∆w(z) is positive (resp. negative) a mutant individual that increases (resp. decreases)
its tendency to delay dispersal puts its genetic lineage at an advantage. It follows that when
∆w(z) is positive (resp. negative) selection favours an increase (resp. decrease) in the
tendency to delay, and so the sign of ∆w(z) reflects the direction of the selection gradient
acting on z. In Appendix B, we use the approach described in Taylor and Frank (1996) to
show that
∆w(z) = sβmˆαvα + sβmˆβvβ − sωnˆαvα︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effects
− sβmˆαcˆ (vα − vβ)rˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effects
(1)
where vα = 1 is the reproductive value of a dominant individual, and vβ = sωnˆαvα is the
reproductive value of a subordinate individual. Reproductive value measures the extent of
an individual’s genetic contribution to generations in the long-run. Here, reproductive value
serves both as an “exchange rate” between the evolutionary significance of dominants and
subordinates, respectively, and as the “gold standard” measure of evolutionary success. It
is worth noting at this point that terms in (1) depend on life-history parameters b, sα, and
sβ, but sω cancels out of equation (1).
Equation (1) has a straightforward biological interpretation. To see what this interpre-
tation entails, consider an individual who (for lack of a better term) intended to disperse
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immediately after its birth, but remained on its natal site as a subordinate for one time
period instead. Now ask, how has this decision altered the evolutionary success of this
individual’s genetic lineage?
First, by staying on its natal site, the individual in question either survives to become a
dominant individual (probability sβmˆα), survives and remains a subordinate (sβmˆβ), or fails
to survive (probability 1−sβ). The value of a dominant individual to its genetic lineage is vα,
the value of a subordinate to its genetic lineage is vβ, and the value of a dead individual to
its genetic lineage is, of course, zero. Combining this information shows us that, by staying,
the individual in question increases the success of its lineage by sβmˆαvα + sβmˆβvβ, which is
represented by the first two terms of equation (1).
Second, by staying on its natal site rather than leaving, the individual in question has
forfeited fitness gains it might have otherwise made elsewhere in the population. Those
gains would have required the individual to survive, and would have included gains made by
winning a dominant position. The amount of evolutionary success forfeited, in this case, is
therefore equal to sωnˆαvα, which is the third term in equation (1).
Third, the decision to stay has implications for other individuals belonging to the same
lineage as the individual in question. By staying for one additional time period, the individual
in question has increased the amount of competition among kin for local dominant vacancies.
Specifically, any success this individual has in securing a dominant position (we can quantify
this success as mˆα) comes at the expense of one other subordinate with probability cˆ. The
displaced subordinate would have been valued by its lineage in the amount vα, but is now
valued at vβ. Moreover, the lineage to which the displaced subordinate belongs is the same
as that to which our focal individual belongs with probability rˆ. It follows that, by staying,
the individual in question further reduces the success of its own lineage by mˆαcˆ (vα − vβ)rˆ,
which is the fourth term in (1).
Overall, we can group terms in (1) in the usual way (Brown, 1987); that is, according to
whether they represent gains/losses made through personal survival and reproduction (“di-
rect effects” on fitness), or whether they represent gains/losses made through the production
of non-descendant kin (“indirect effects” on fitness).
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3. Method of Analysis and Results I: Delayed-Dispersal
3.1. Simulation algorithm
We analysed our delayed-dispersal model using a numerical simulation of the evolution of
z (Figure 2). The simulation relied on the fact that the sign of ∆w(z) indicates the direction
in which selection acts to change z (Rousset, 2004). As previously mentioned, if ∆w(z) > 0
then z is increasing over time, and if ∆w(z) < 0 then z is decreasing over time. Of course,
if ∆w(z) = 0 then z is at an evolutionary steady state.
The simulation, itself, consisted of two replicate populations. One population initially
had a z near zero, while the other initially had a z near one. All other life-history parameters
in the two replicates were set to identical values. Values of z in each replicate population were
updated, independently, by adding a multiple of ∆w(z) to the most recent rate. Updating
continued until z values in the replicate populations were sufficiently close to one another.
By using two replicate populations, then, we were able to use a clear stopping criterion for
our simulation. Overall, our simulation produced a prediction for the stable tendency to
delay dispersal (the stable z) under given set of life-history conditions.
3.2. Simulation-based predictions
Intermediate phenotypes (0 < z < 1) are predicted to be stable in only a narrow range
of parameter space. As shown in Figure 3a-c, outside of this narrow range selection results
in either (1) all immature individuals delay dispersal, and forgo the chance to mature and
reproduce independently for one time period (z = 1), or (2) all immature dispersing in
the same year in which they were born, mature and attempt to reproduce as dominant
individuals (z = 0).
In general, delaying dispersal (resp. dispersing immediately) during the first year is
favoured more readily when fecundity and/or survivorship is high (resp. low) (Figure 3a-c).
This result is due to the assumption that individuals born on a territory have an advantage
over non-native dispersers when competing for dominant vacancies, and it can be understood
sufficiently well in terms of direct-fitness effects only (Figure 3d-f). As fecundity is increased,
the competitive pressure from subordinates for dominant vacancies intensifies, and the chance
of a disperser securing a dominant territory is reduced disproportionately. As dominant sur-
vivorship increases, the competitive pressure from subordinates also increases—not because
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Input: Birth rate, b
Survival rate of dominant, sα
Survival rate of subordinate, sβ
Small step size, STEP > 0
Small tolerance, TOL > 0
Output: Numerical prediction for stable tendency to delay dispersal
Algorithm
Step 0: Initialize two variables (i.e. replicates), Z1 = 0 and Z2 = 1 
Step 1: Use z = Z1, and inputs b, sα, sβ to compute GRAD = Δw(z) using 
equation 1
Step 2: Update Z1 by setting its new value equal to Z1 + GRAD*STEP
Step 3: If Z1 < 0 set it equal to 0, if Z1 > 1 set it equal to 1
Step 4: Repeat Steps 1 to 3 using Z2 in place of Z1
Step 5: If |Z1 – Z2| > TOL go back to Step 1, else return (Z1 + Z2)/2
Figure 2: Description of the numerical simulation procedure used to determine the
stable delay-dispersal phenotype, z, meaning that value of z favoured by selection
in the long-run.
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there are more natives, but because there are fewer vacancies over which individuals com-
pete. Therefore, by delaying dispersal, an individual can profit from a valuable competitive
advantage it would otherwise lose. Should that same individual not compete successfully, it
may still survive to compete as a disperser in the next time period. In this way, an individ-
ual who delays dispersal is no worse off than one who did not (the absence of opportunity
cost is common in models of cooperative breeding in stable habitats (McLeod and Wild,
2013)). In fact, delaying dispersal naturally affords individuals the opportunity to compete
for vacancies twice: on its natal territory the first time, and elsewhere the second time.
Increased survivorship as a subordinate, then, incentivizes delayed dispersal by improving
one’s chances of competing a second time.
0
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Figure 3: Results for Model I: delayed dispersal. Long-term, stable tendency to
delay dispersal (stable z) as a function of subordinate survival rate (sβ) for varying
dominant survival rate sα, and varying birth rate b. Panels (a)-(c) show predictions
from the complete inclusive-fitness model, while panels (d)-(f) uses direct-fitness
effects only. Predictions do not depend on sω.
The fact that direct-fitness considerations, alone, provide us with good understanding
of the long-term evolution of z is also consistent with the quasi-threshold effect evident in
Figure 3. When indirect-fitness considerations are small, compared to the direct-fitness ones,
11
there will be little to oppose the pursuit of selfish interests over the course of evolution. The
answer to the question, “ Is it advantageous to delay dispersal?”, then, will almost always
be a clear “yes” or “no” because only one individual’s perspective need be adopted. This
kind of clarity ultimately means selection will drive z to take a value of 0 (when the clear
answer is “no”) or 1 (when the clear answer is “yes”) over time.
4. Model II: Subordinate Helping
From the previous section, we predict that delayed dispersal evolves readily when fecun-
dity and survivorship are sufficiently high. Once delayed dispersal has emerged, non-breeding
relatives from different generations have the opportunity to interact, and so the subordinate
helping rate, denoted h, may be expected to evolve to non-zero levels. In this section we
extend our first model to determine conditions under which subordinate helping, h > 0, is
advantageous.
4.1. Monomorphic Wild-type Population
We again consider the wild-type population described above. We assume that life-history
parameters are such that the action of selection has resulted in all individuals delaying
dispersal (z = 1), and we assume that the wild-type subordinate does not help (h = 0).
4.2. The Inclusive-Fitness Effect of Subordinate Help
Consider a subordinate on a territory at the very beginning of a time period. Suppose
that this mature subordinate individual carries a mutant allele that causes it to interact with
one of the b immature individuals produced by the dominants on its territory just prior to
its own dispersal (see Figure 1).
We assume that the interaction in question is costly for the subordinate who is about to
disperse. Specifically, the interaction diminishes the physical condition of this subordinate
so that the likelihood with which it survives as a disperser is changed by ∆sω < 0. We
also assume that the interaction in question is beneficial for the immature individual. In
this case, the interaction improves the condition of the immature individual so that its
survival, following maturation, as a subordinate is changed by ∆sβ > 0 (recall that we have
assumed z = 1). The assumptions we make in this model reflect typical interactions among
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cooperative breeders, with non-breeding individuals paying a cost to ultimately promote the
production of non-descendant kin (Heinsohn and Legge, 1999).
In Appendix C, we show that the helpful act has changed the inclusive fitness of the
subordinate actor by
∆w(h) = ∆sβ(mˆαvα + mˆβvβ − mˆαcˆ (vα − vβ)) rˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effect
+ ∆sωnˆαvα.︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect
(2)
We also argue, in Appendix C, that rˆ, the relatedness between two different individuals born
on the same territory during the same time period, is the relevant measure of relatedness for
studying the advantage of costly subordinate help.
Like equation (1), equation (2) has a straightforward interpretation, but we will dispense
with the details of the interpretation, here. It is important, though, to note that when
∆w(h) is positive (resp. negative) a helpful act confers an advantage (resp. disadvantage)
to a subordinate actor’s lineage when the act, itself, is directed toward a recipient born on
the same territory as the actor.
5. Method of Analysis and Results II: Subordinate Helping
By simple algebraic rearrangement of the condition ∆w(h) > 0, we can arrive at a
critical cost-benefit ratio, −(∆sω/sω)/(∆sβ/sβ), above which subordinate helping is disad-
vantageous. By expressing the change in survival (∆sω or ∆sβ, respectively) relative to
survival rates themselves (sω and sβ, respectively), we obtain a critical ratio that does not
depend on sω.
Study of the critical cost-benefit ratio shows that increases in both survivorship and
fecundity promotes the emergence of subordinate help. Evidence of this is presented in
Figure 4. In that figure, we see larger values of sα, sβ, and b, respectively, increase the range
of conditions under which the advantage of help is maintained under large relative costs.
As an example of what we mean, consider what happens as the fecundity parameter b is
increased in Figure 4 (from left to right): the region of sα,sβ-space over which the advantage
of help is maintained increases in area, when the cost-benefit ratio exceeds 10.0. Carrying
on with this example, if we assume sω = sβ, then our critical cost-benefit ratio takes a more
usual form, −∆sω/∆sβ. Certainly, the condition −∆sω/∆sβ < 10.0 is not overly restrictive
and suggests the indirect benefits in equation (2) can translate to appreciable inclusive-fitness
gains.
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Figure 4: Results for Model II: subordinate helping. Contours for critical cost-benefit
ratio, −(∆sω/sω)/(∆sβ/sβ), when all individuals become subordinates (z = 1). Darker
black contours are shown in the space of dominant and subordinate survival rates (sα and
sβ, respectively), and calculated for various fecundity parameters (b). Contour labels 1.0,
or 10.0 give the value of the cost-benefit ratio which, if not exceeded, ensures subordinate
helping a selective advantage. Shaded region shows where complete delayed dispersal,
z = 1, is not stable. To ensure z = 1 is stable, life-history parameters must lie in the
unshaded region of sβ, sα-space.
6. Discussion and Conclusions
6.1. Comparison with Previous Models
Models of the evolution of cooperative breeding often assume an individual’s tendency
to delay dispersal is linked to its tendency to help (Motro, 1993; Pen and Weissing, 2000;
Leggett et al., 2012; McLeod and Wild, 2013; Wild and Koykka, 2014). Those that have
sought to separate the link between staying and helping have either treated relatedness as a
fixed parameter (Kokko and Johnstone, 1999; Kokko et al., 2001), have neglected the possi-
bility that relatedness builds within social groups while placing severe limits on subordinate
numbers (Koykka and Wild, 2015), or have focused on modelling delayed dispersal only
(Kokko and Lundberg, 2001; Kokko and Ekman, 2002).
Here, we provide an explanation for the evolution of cooperative breeding that separates
delaying dispersal from helping, while providing equal coverage to both behaviours. Our
explanation also makes clear assumptions that show how relatedness within social groups,
among other things, changes with changing life-history parameters, and ultimately how
those changes impact the origin of cooperative breeding. This brings theory for cooperative
breeding in line with that of many other social behaviours, including more generic forms of
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altruism (Taylor, 1992a,b), natal dispersal (Taylor, 1989), reproductive effort (Pen, 2000), sex
allocation (Wild and Taylor, 2004, 2005), and sexual conflict (Wild et al., 2011). We have
also allowed variable numbers of subordinates to inhabit breeding territories (cf. Koykka
and Wild, 2015). In all of these ways, then, our work represents a step forward in our
understanding of cooperative breeding.
6.2. Delayed Dispersal
Our model for the evolution of delayed dispersal makes two main predictions. First, it
predicts that indirect effects of delayed dispersal have minimal impact on the evolution of this
trait. We found that predictions of a modified version of equation (1), one that ignored effects
on relatives, made predictions that were very close to those made by the full inclusive-fitness
model. Previous models for the evolution of delayed dispersal have purposefully neglected the
indirect effects of delayed dispersal (Kokko and Lundberg, 2001; Kokko and Ekman, 2002).
The importance of competition among siblings has been identified by theoretical models
of dispersal in species without dominance hierarchies (Hamilton and May, 1977; Taylor,
1988), and is considered to be a prominent force shaping sociality in cooperative breeders
(Gaston, 1978; Griffin and West, 2002). We see here, however, that ignoring those effects in
cooperative breeders is unlikely to lead one too far astray provided the assumptions of the
model are met. Chief among these assumptions is the degree of ‘habitat elasticity’ (Taylor,
1992b) experienced by subordinates. Subordinate individuals in our model may compete
with relatives for breeding opportunities, but they do not compete with relatives in order to
simply remain on their natal territory. Instead, a territory effectively expands in an ‘elastic’
manner to accommodate variable numbers of subordinates, thus reducing inclusive-fitness
costs of delaying dispersal.
The kind of habitat elasticity experienced by subordinates in our model is not at all
far-fetched. Though cooperative-breeding vertebrates often occupy saturated habitats, it
is suitable breeding habitat that is considered to be saturated. Non-breeding individuals
are often able to remain near their natal sites, “floating” in available marginal habitat and
reducing competition with kin (Stacey and Ligon, 1991). This also applies to social insects,
whose territories expand as their colonies grow. Expansion, here, is either due to (1) the fact
that social insects are central site foragers, where increasing forager numbers increases the
foraging area that can be explored and exploited, or (2) the fact that territories occupied
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have vast food supplies that, in turn, allow for the coexistence of vast numbers of insects
with minimal local competition (Korb and Heinze, 2008).
The second, perhaps more important, prediction made by our delayed-dispersal model
concerns the effect of life-history parameters. We found that increased longevity and in-
creased fecundity both promote delayed dispersal. In keeping with our previous comments,
these effects are well understood in terms of direct consequences for personal fitness. These
points are discussed further below, but it is worth stressing that our results confirm previous
conjectures about life-history effects on delayed dispersal, particularly fecundity (Kokko and
Ekman, 2002).
6.3. Subordinate Helping, Life-History Features, and Cooperative Breeding
Our second model predicts that increased survivorship and fecundity, respectively, in-
crease the maximum cost that can support an advantage of helping. This is similar to the
predictions made by our model for delayed dispersal. Since cooperative breeding is thought
to have arisen as a result of the emergence of delayed dispersal followed by helping (Brown,
1974; Emlen, 1982a), our models predict that life-histories that consist of low mortality and
high fecundity promote the evolution of cooperative breeding, overall.
Life-history-based hypotheses for the advantage of cooperative breeding have focused on
the role played by mortality, especially the mortality of dominant breeders. It is often argued
that low mortality results in overcrowded populations with limited availability of breeding
habitat due to low rates of turnover (Arnold and Owens, 1998; Beauchamp, 2014). Our
results agree with this predicted association between the occurrence of cooperative breeding
and mortality/survival.
Life-history hypotheses have also tended to downplay the effects fecundity might exert in
the emergence of cooperative breeding systems. Authors predict that cooperative breeding
will be associated with smaller clutch sizes, owing to a trade-off between survival and fecun-
dity (Arnold and Owens, 1998; Beauchamp, 2014). Essentially this perspective characterizes
fecundity as a life-history response to cooperative breeding, rather than a life-history feature
that might directly promote help.
In contrast to the typical life-history-based views, our results show that, all else being
equal, increases in fecundity can promote cooperative breeding via increasing incentives to
both delay dispersal and to help. Incentives, here, stem from the fact that increased fecundity
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can also result in low territory turnover, and a build-up of within-territory relatedness—or,
more simply, high rates of territory retention by a given genetic lineage.
Certainly, our modelling shows that fecundity and survival both have a primary role to
play in promoting and shaping cooperative breeding, but what practical implications might
this have? One answer has to do with the mixed support life-history hypotheses have re-
ceived (Arnold and Owens, 1998; Beauchamp, 2014). In the presence of a trade-off between
survivorship and fecundity, one might not expect any clear life-history pattern to be asso-
ciated with cooperative breeding. Macroscopic features of the population, like low rates of
territory turn-over, could be associated equally well with high fecundity and low mortality,
or low fecundity and high mortality, or even intermediate levels of both. Granted, com-
parative analyses have found little differences in birth rates of cooperatively breeding and
non-cooperatively breeding species (Arnold and Owens, 1998; Beauchamp, 2014). Variation
in birth rates, however, was still reported by these analyses and could definitely confound
efforts to extract a clear “life-history signal” from the data collected. In addition, compara-
tive analyses cannot explain why longevity alone does not lead to cooperative breeding more
frequently in certain taxa (Arnold and Owens, 1998). Perhaps such puzzles presented by
the absence of cooperative breeding could be solved by giving greater consideration to the
role played by fecundity in directly promoting cooperative breeding, and may require deeper
investigation into the details of relevant survival-fecundity trade-offs. Alternatively, it may
be necessary to develop measures of territory turnover rates, rather than indices of habitat
saturation, that combine fecundity and survival field data in meaningful ways to improve
comparative analyses. To this end, terms like mˆα or cˆ, that appear in equations (1) and (2)
might serve as useful guides for field biologists.
We may extend the above considerations to social insects. Social hymenoptera (ants
and some bees and wasps) as well as termites, which evolved eusociality independently, are
characterized by an apparent reversal (or absence) of the fecundity/longevity trade-off. The
most fecund individuals (queens, and in termites also kings) outlive the non-reproducing
workers and soldiers by one to two orders of magnitude (Keller and Genoud, 1997; Keller,
1998; Monroy Kuhn and Korb, 2016). An extreme example comes from fungus-growing
Macrotermes termites in which the lifespan of queens is more than 15-20 years while the
workers only live 2-3 months (Traniello and Leuthold, 2000). At the same time, these
queens are the most fertile individuals amongst all animals as they lay up to 20 000 eggs
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per day. The evolution of this reshaping of the fecundity/longevity trade-off is still poorly
understood but one may speculate that, after the evolution of helping, feedback between
sociality, increased survival and fecundity may explain it.
Insects have higher maximum fecundities than vertebrates and it has been speculated
that this may explain why eusociality rarely evolved in the latter (Alexander et al., 1991;
Korb, 2009). Strikingly, the single eusocial vertebrates are rodents, those mammals with the
highest fecundity. Hence, high fecundity, which allows for large families with many offspring
to care for, may facilitate the evolution of altruism and set the stage for the co-evolution of
sociality, and increased survival and fecundity.
6.4. Limitations and Future Work
Models are always limited by their assumptions, and several key assumptions limit those
presented here. One of the most important assumptions we made, was the assumption of
weak selection: an individual’s tendency to delay dispersal was slight, as were the effects of
helping on the survival of actors and recipients alike. In mathematical terms, weak selection
means that we cannot use our model to definitively assess the evolutionary stability of
strategies, as these have been traditionally defined (Rousset, 2004). In biological terms, this
means our model cannot be used to study non-additive effects, like any possible synergy that
could occur among helpers as a helpful gene invades (Grafen, 1985). Extensions of this work
that consider higher-order effects of behaviours (e.g. using the analytic tools of adaptive
dynamics (Dercole and Rinaldi, 2008)) could, therefore, be fruitful.
A second key feature of our work was the assumption that delayed dispersal had become
established prior to the emergence of helping. Though this idea has some long-standing sup-
port in the biological literature (Brown, 1974; Emlen, 1982a; Koenig et al., 1992; Hatchwell
and Komdeur, 2000; Kokko and Lundberg, 2001; Kokko and Ekman, 2002), an alternative
scenario – where helping arises first, then delay dispersal emerges to enhance helping – has
not been explored theoretically. That said, there is little, if any, evidence that such an alter-
native scenario has actually occurred, as it would likely be recognized as within-generation
altruism rather than cooperative breeding.
Our focus on the origins of helping is yet another limitation of our work. Indeed, few
studies have tracked the coevolution of delayed dispersal and helping beyond their origins as
independent traits, and those that have tracked said coevolution have presented relatively
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complicated results (Koykka and Wild, 2015). Clearly, origins of helping along with the
subsequent maintenance of cooperative breeding via coevolution deserve further attention.
Finally, we chose to model the tendency to delay dispersal as a condition-independent
strategy. In natural populations, though, delays in dispersal can be informed by an indi-
vidual’s physiological condition, as well as local population densities, and the availability of
suitable alternative habitats (Pruett-Jones and Lewis, 1990). Helping may also be expressed
in a similarly facultative manner (Holman, 2014). While our decision to ignore condition
dependence likely did not influence our basic conclusions (e.g., population elasticity would
have reduced kin competition even with condition-dependence), accounting for condition-
dependent strategies might be important when investigating the levels to which helping and
dispersal evolve once helping becomes established. Thus, ignoring condition dependence as
we have done could limit our ability to extrapolate our conclusions beyond simply the emer-
gence of cooperative breeding to include maintenance and longer-term evolution of these
systems. The role of condition dependence in the origins of cooperative breeding is one of
several interesting lines of further research.
Appendix A. Monomorphic Wild-type Population Without Subordinate Help
Appendix A.1. Equilibrium State
In this section, we develop the mathematical expressions that characterize the equilibrium
state of the wild-type population, in the absence of subordinate help, as a distribution of the
state of the territories in the population. We define the “state” of a territory as the number
of subordinates found there at the beginning of a given time period. Since these probabilities
are identical for each territory, the population converges to its equilibrium state after only a
single time period.
Let pˆj denote the frequency of territories supporting j = 0, 1, . . . , b subordinates at equi-
librium. We express equilibrium frequencies in terms of the number of dominant vacancies
on a given territory, k = 0, 1, 2, and the number of surviving subordinates who have also
delayed dispersal, ` = 0, 1, . . . , b. For example, to determine an expression for pˆ0 we note
that there are exactly k vacancies on a given territory in any given time step with probability
(
2
k
)
s2−kα (1− sα)k. (A.1)
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Conditioned on the event that k dominant vacancies arise, the territory in question ends up
with j = 0 subordinates when no more than k of the b offspring produced have survived and
delayed dispersal (if fewer than k survive and delay dispersal, then vacancies are filled by
dispersers, as described in the main text). The probability with which this conditional event
occurs is given by
k∑
`=0
(
b
`
)
(zsβ)
`(1− zsβ)k−`. (A.2)
Combining the previous observations using the Law of Total Probability, we get
pˆ0 =
2∑
k=0
(
2
k
)
s2−kα (1− sα)k
k∑
`=0
(
b
`
)
(zsβ)
`(1− zsβ)k−`. (A.3)
Similar conditioning arguments results in the following overall description for pˆj:
pˆj =

2∑
k=0
(
2
k
)
s2−kα (1− sα)k
k∑
`=0
(
b
`
)
(zsβ)
`(1− zsβ)b−` j = 0,
2∑
k=0
(
2
k
)
s2−kα (1− sα)k
(
b
k + j
)
(zsβ)
k+j(1− zsβ)b−(k+j) 1 ≤ j ≤ b− 2,
1∑
k=0
(
2
k
)
s2−kα (1− sα)k
(
b
k + b− 1
)
(zsβ)
k+(b−1)(1− zsβ)b−(k+b−1) j = b− 1
s2α(zsβ)
b j = b.
(A.4)
The equilibrium state of the population, then, is given by pˆ0, . . . , pˆb. Note that pˆ0 is the
probability of the event that all surviving subordinates fill local vacancies left by dominants,
and pˆj≥1 is the probability of the event that all but j surviving subordinates fill local vacancies
left by dominants. As a check, note that
∑
j pˆj = 1, as expected.
Appendix A.2. Success of Dispersers
We continue to consider a monomorphic wild-type population without subordinate help,
but now we determine the number of dominant positions each surviving disperser expects to
secure at equilibrium. This number, denoted nˆα, is simply the expected number of vacancies
available to dispersers,
1× 2sα(1− sα)(1− zsβ)b + (1− sα)2bzsβ(1− zsβ)b−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
prob one vacancy for dispersers
+2× (1− sα)2(1− zsβ)b︸ ︷︷ ︸
prob two vacancies for dispersers
(A.5)
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divided by the number of surviving dispersers, sω[(1− z)b +
∑
j jpˆj] (dispersing individuals
born in the current time period plus former subordinates). Using the expressions in (A.4) it
is possible to show that
∑
j jpˆj, is equal to the number of surviving subordinates from the
previous time period less the number of vacancies filled by this group. Mathematically, the
number of surviving dispersers, sω[(1− z)b +
∑
j jpˆj], is given by
sω
(1− z)b + bzsβ︸︷︷︸
# surviving subordinates
− (2(1− sα)− 2sα(1− sα)(1− zsβ)b − (1− sα)2(bzsβ(1− zsβ)b−1 + 2(1− zsβ)b))︸ ︷︷ ︸
# vacancies filled by non-dispersers
 (A.6)
and so the expected number of territories won by a surviving disperser is,
nˆα =
2sα(1− sα)(1− zsβ)b + (1− sα)2bzsβ(1− zsβ)b−1 + 2(1− sα)2(1− zsβ)b
sω[(1− z)b +
∑
j jpˆj]
. (A.7)
This expression for nˆα will be used in the development of fitness expressions in a subsequent
section.
Careful consideration of equation (A.7) reveals that one disperser can win multiple dom-
inant positions; that is, nˆα might be greater than one. This situation is typical of social
evolutionary models of behaviour—for example in models of sex-ratio evolution where males
secure multiple female mates (Wild and Taylor, 2004). This model feature arguably implies
that the model itself over-estimates the success of dispersers. However, the model feature
could be understood as a single individual being part of several different mated pairs, as
in any one of a number of cases of extra-pair parentage found in the literature (Petrie and
Kempenaers, 1998). Regardless of interpretation, the model feature is an important techni-
cal part of our model, because it ensures that vacancies which cannot be filled locally never
go unfilled, and so the population does not tend to extinction over time.
Appendix A.3. Success of Subordinates
Now we turn our attention to the expected number of dominant and subordinate positions
won by a surviving non-disperser in a wild-type population at equilibrium, denoted mˆα and
mˆβ, respectively.
We calculate mˆα by (a) fixing attention on an immature individual that stays on its
natal territory and survives to become a subordinate (possibly only temporarily), then (b)
conditioning on the dispersal and survival of various territory inhabitants to get
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mˆα = (1− sα)2×[
1∑
`=0
(
b− 1
`
)
(zsβ)
`(1− zsβ)b−1−` +
b−1∑
`=2
(
b− 1
`
)
(zsβ)
`(1− zsβ)b−1−` 2
` + 1
]
+ 2sα(1− sα)
b−1∑
`=0
(
b− 1
`
)
(zsβ)
`(1− zsβ)b−1−` 1
` + 1
=
2(1− sα)(1− (1− zsβ)b)− (1− sα)2bzsβ(1− zsβ)b−1
bzsβ
. (A.8)
Equation (A.8) can be understood as follows. In the case that two local vacancies arise
(probability (1−sα)2), the focal individual secures a local dominant position with probability
1 provided no more than one other subordinate survived (summarized by the first term
in square brackets in equation A.8). If two or more additional subordinates are able to
compete for the vacancies, then the focal individual secures a local dominant position with
probability less than 1 (summarized by the second term in square brackets in equation A.8).
If only one vacancy arises (probability 2sα(1−sα)), the focal individual secures the dominant
position with probability 1 only when no other subordinate is present to contest the vacancy
(summarized by the final summation in equation A.8). As a check, notice that when we add
the numerator of mˆα in (A.8) to the numerator of nˆα in equation (A.7), the sum is 2(1− sα)
which is the total dominant vacancy rate.
By conditioning on the dispersal and survival of all but a focal subordinate, we find that
the probability with which that subordinate does not have to compete for a local dominant
position against a relative (i.e. the probability that said position is uncontested by a relative
of the subordinate) is
uˆ =
2sα(1− sα)(1− zsβ)b−1 + (1− sα)2
(
(1− zsβ)b−1 + (b− 1)(1− zsβ)b−2
)
mˆα
. (A.9)
It follows that the fraction of sites that are contested by relatives at equilibrium is, cˆ = 1− uˆ,
or
cˆ = 1− 2sα(1− sα)(1− zsβ)
b−1 + (1− sα)2
(
(1− zsβ)b−1 + (b− 1)(1− zsβ)b−2
)
mˆα
. (A.10)
A similiar line of reasoning gives us
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mˆβ = (1− sα)2
b−1∑
`=2
(
b− 1
`
)
(zsβ)
`(1− zsβ)b−1−`
(
1− 2
` + 1
)
+ 2sα(1− sα)
b−1∑
`=1
(
b− 1
`
)
(zsβ)
`(1− zsβ)b−1−`
(
1− 1
` + 1
)
+ s2α = 1− mˆα, (A.11)
which makes intuitive sense, because a subordinate who survives either becomes a domi-
nant or remains a subordinate. In fact, this calculation serves as yet another check on the
correctness of (A.8).
Appendix A.4. Calculation of Relatedness
Here, we provide an explicit expression for rˆ, the coefficient of relatedness between two
individuals born on the same territory during the same time period. Again, to make our
calculations we assume that the population is at equilbrium, genetically monomorphic, and
that subordinates do not help.
We begin by considering the relatedness between the two dominant breeders that occupy
the same territory in a given time step, denoted f . Technically, f gives the probability
that one breeder carries an allele at some focal locus that is identical by descent (IBD)
to the allele carried by the other breeder at the same locus (Michod and Hamilton, 1980).
We make the usual assumption that two individuals born on different territories have a
coefficient of relatedness equal to zero (e.g. Taylor, 1992a). After any given time period,
then, the relatedness between breeders can either increase to one, decrease to zero, or remain
unchanged. It follows that the relatedness between dominant breeders in the next time step,
denoted f ′, can be expressed recursively as,
f ′ = f × (1− P1 − P0) + 1× P1 + 0× P0 (A.12)
where P1 is the probability with which the relatedness increases to 1, and P0 is the probability
with which it decreases to zero. We find
P1 =
1
2
2sα(1− sα)[1− (1− zsβ)b] + 1
2
(1− sα)2[1− (1− zsβ)b − bzsβ(1− zsβ)b−1]. (A.13)
The first term in equation (A.13) gives the probability that exactly one dominant dies, at least
one subordinate is available to succeed the deceased dominant, and the surviving dominant
made the genetic contribution to the successor. The second term in equation (A.13) gives
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the probability that both dominants die, at least two subordinates are available to succeed
the deceased dominants, and the two successors both received genetic contributions from the
same breeder. A similar argument allows one to arrive at the remaining terms in (A.13),
and also leads one to conclude that
P0 = 2sα(1− sα)(1− zsβ)b + (1− sα)2[(1− zsβ)b + bzsβ(1− zsβ)b−1]. (A.14)
At equilibrium, f = f ′ = fˆ where
fˆ =
P1
P1 + P0
. (A.15)
We now use fˆ to express the relatedness between two individuals born on the same territory
during the same time period, denoted rˆ. Conditioning on the identity of the dominant
breeder(s) who made the genetic contribution to the individuals being compared, we find
rˆ =
1 + fˆ
2
. (A.16)
This is the measure of relatedness featured in the main text.
Appendix B. The Selective Advantage of Delayed Dispersal
Appendix B.1. Key Assumptions
Suppose that the tendency to delay dispersal is controlled at a single locus, and suppose
further that there are two alleles at this locus, one wild-type allele and one mutant allele (no
longer is the model population genetically monomorphic). A mutant remains on its natal
site at a rate that differs only slightly from the wild-type rate, z; in other words, selection is
assumed to be weak.
Appendix B.2. Components of Fitness
In order to determine whether the mutant is at an advantage/disadvantage, and ulti-
mately the direction in which selection moves z, we use the “direct-fitness approach” (Taylor
and Frank, 1996).
The direct-fitness approach requires expressions for fitness. For this model, we develop
fitness expressions for an immature individual at the very beginning of a given time period
(the “focal individual”). Each focal individual has two distinct components of fitness. The
first component represents the likelihood with which the focal individual belongs to the
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dominant class in the next time period, and is denoted wα. The second component represents
the likelihood with which it belongs to the subordinate class in the next time period, and is
denoted wβ. We deal with each component in turn, below.
Consider wα, the likelihood that a focal individual belongs to the dominant class in the
next time period, or more accurately, the expected number of dominant positions won by
the focal individual in the next time period. We will break the calculation of wα into two
parts: the number of dominant positions won on its natal territory in the next time period
(i.e. locally), and the number of dominant positions won on territories other than its natal
territory in the next time period (i.e. non-locally).
Let z0 denote the focal individual’s tendency to delay dispersal, and let z1 denote the
tendency of another individual, born on the same territory and at the same time as the focal
individual, to delay its own dispersal. Conditioning on the event that the focal individual
stays on its natal patch and survives (probability z0sβ), then applying the same argument
that led to equation (A.8), we find that the number of local dominant positions next time is
z0sβ
2(1− sα)(1− (1− z1sβ)b)− (1− sα)2bz1sβ(1− z1sβ)b−1
bz1sβ
. (B.1)
In order to determine the number of non-local successes, we condition on the event that
the focal individual disperses and survives to compete for a vacancy (probabilty (1− z0)sω).
Because selection is weak, we can approximate the number of vacancies available using the
expression for nˆα already derived for a wild-type population at equilibrium (see Appendix
A). Consequently, the number of non-local dominant position next time is
(1− z0)sωnˆα. (B.2)
We arrive at an expression for wα by simply summing equations (B.1) and (B.2):
wα = z0sβ
2(1− sα)(1− (1− z1sβ)b)− (1− sα)2bz1sβ(1− z1sβ)b−1
bz1sβ
+ (1− z0)sωnˆα. (B.3)
Now, consider the likelihood with which the focal individual belongs to the subordinate
class at the beginning of the next time period, wβ. Given the assumptions of the model,
an individual can only become a subordinate if it remains on its natal territory, and so
we condition on the event that the focal individual has delayed dispersal and has survived
(probability z0sβ). Using the approach that led to equation (A.11), we get
wβ = z0sβ
(
1− 2(1− sα)(1− (1− z1sβ)
b)− (1− sα)2bz1sβ(1− z1sβ)b−1
bz1sβ
)
. (B.4)
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Appendix B.3. Combining Components of Fitness
Expressions (B.3) and (B.4) can be combined into a single measure of fitness using co-
efficients of reproductive value. “Reproductive value” is defined as the genetic contribution
made by an individual to the population in the very distant future (Taylor, 1996). If we use
vα to denote the reproductive value of a dominant individual, then reproductive value of a
subordinate becomes vβ = sωnˆαvα. The expression for vβ can be understood as the product
of three terms: the probability with which a subordinate later survives as a disperser to
compete on a new territory, the expected number of dominant positions it wins, and its
value as a dominant. This measure of reproductive value is approximated to zeroth order in
the strength of selection.
With reproductive value defined, we get
w = vαwα + vβwβ (B.5)
as our measure of the overall fitness of a focal individual.
Appendix B.4. The Inclusive-Fitness Effect of Philopatry
Using Taylor and Frank (1996) as a guide, we calculate ∆w(z) by (a) treating z1 as a
function of z0, (b) differentiating w with respect to z0, paying careful attention to the Chain
Rule from freshman calculus, (c) substituting the relatedness between the focal individual
and its newborn neighbour, denoted rˆ (see Appendix A), in place of the ordinary derivative
dz1/dz0, and (d) evaluating the entire expression at z0 = z1 = z and. These steps lead to
equation (1) in the main text.
Appendix C. Model Extension: the Advantage of Subordinate Help
Appendix C.1. Preliminary Comments
In this section, we consider a scenario in which selection has led all individuals to delay
dispersal for one time period (i.e., z = 1). We develop an expression for the inclusive-fitness
advantage/disadvantage created by a helpful subordinate individual on a territory at the
beginning of a time step, in this case. We dispense with the direct-fitness methodology
used in a previous section, and instead use a more traditional inclusive-fitness approach
(Taylor, 1990). However, we do assume the reader is familiar with the contents of previous
appendices.
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Appendix C.2. Marginal Changes in Fitness
Suppose the helpful individual in question reduces its own condition to improve the
condition of an immature individual on its territory. Let s′ω denote the eventual survival
rate of the helper that results from its reduced condition, and let ∆sω = s
′
ω − sω < 0 denote
the marginal effect helping has on helper’s eventual survival as a disperser. Similarly, let s′β
denote the eventual survival rate of the immature individual whose condition is improved by
the helper, and let ∆sβ = s
′
β−sβ > 0 denote the marginal improvement in survival rate that
occurs. In keeping with our assumption of weak selection, both ∆sω and ∆sβ are assumed
to be small.
Following equation (A.8), we see that the likelihood with which the recipient of the help
becomes a dominant individual in the next time period is s′β mˆα, whereas without help the
likelihood would have been sβmˆα. It follows that
∆sβ mˆα (C.1)
is one of the immediate benefits of help. It should be understood that mˆα in (C.1) is
calculated with z = 1.
A second immediate benefit of helping is realized in the case where the recipient belongs
to the subordinate class in the next time period. The second benefit is calculated in a manner
analogous to the one in (C.1), and is expressed as
∆sβmˆβ, (C.2)
where it is understood that mˆβ is calculated with z = 1.
Because it improves survival, helping increases the extent of competition among kin for
dominant positions. This is a deferred cost of helping, and it is incurred when the recipient
of the help displaces a relative. We express the cost as
∆sβmˆαcˆ (C.3)
where it is, once again, understood that z = 1.
Finally, the helper also changes its own fitness. Specifically, it reduces the likelihood with
which it fills a dominant vacancy, following its own inevitable dispersal, by an amount equal
to
s′ωnˆα − sωnˆα = ∆sωnˆα. (C.4)
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The fitness changes described above must be weighted by measures of reproductive value
so that they be combined into a single, overall expression for inclusive-fitness change. The
appropriate measures are again vα and vβ presented in Appendix B. To be clear, changes
in lines (C.1) and (C.4) must be weighted by vα, the change in line (C.2) must be weighted
by vβ, and the change in line (C.3) must be weighted by vα − vβ. Lines (C.1) to (C.3) must
also be weighted by relatedness coefficients. These coefficients are calculated below.
Appendix C.3. Relatedness
We will use the calculations presented in Appendix A in order to determine the correct
coefficient of relatedness to use in our second model. It is important to remember that the
calculations carried out below assume that z = 1 and h = 0.
Fix attention on a subordinate at the beginning of time period t. During time period
t − 1 we know that, on the territory with which the subordinate is associated, there were
more than enough other subordinates to fill any dominant vacancies that might have arisen
(otherwise, we would not have found the focal subordinate there, by assumption). Let qi
denote the probability that i = 0, 1, 2 dominant positions were filled at the end of time t−1 on
the focal subordinate’s natal territory. We will not concern ourselves with developing explicit
expressions for qis since these ultimately drop out of our calculation. We will, however, use
qis to guide our calculation of relatedness between the focal subordinate and an immature
individual on the same territory.
Consider a uniform-random immature individual on the same territory as the focal sub-
ordinate, at the beginning of time period t. With probability q0 the dominant individuals
that occupy the focal territory during time period t also occupied the territory during time
period t−1. In this case, the focal subordinate and the immature may have the same parent
(probability 1/2) so that they are related by a factor of 1. Alternatively, the focal subordi-
nate and the immature individual may have different parents (probability 1/2) so that they
are related by a factor of fˆ . With probability q0, then, the relatedness between the focal
subordinate and a given immature individual on the same territory is (1 + fˆ)/2 = rˆ.
With probability q1 one of the dominant individuals at the beginning of time period t also
occupied the territory during time t− 1, while the other dominant individual is breeding for
the first time during time period t. In this case, the parent of the immature individual under
consideration may be the first-time dominant (probability 1/2) so that the subordinate and
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the immature individual are related by a factor rˆ. Alternatively, the parent of the immature
may be the more experienced dominant (probability 1/2). The more experienced dominant
may also be the parent of the focal subordinate (probability 1/2), so that the relatedness
between subordinate and the immature is 1. If the more experienced dominant is not the
parent of the focal subordinate (probability 1/2), then the relevant relatedness is fˆ since
the subordinate’s parent would have been found alongside the more experienced dominant
during time t− 1. With probability q1, then, the relatedness between the focal subordinate
and a given immature individual is rˆ/2 + (1/2)(1 + fˆ)/2 = rˆ.
With probability q2, both dominant individuals are first-time dominants during period
t. By assumption, both would have been born during the same time period as the focal
subordinate (time period t−1). It follows that the relatedness between the focal subordinate
and any immature produced during time period t is rˆ.
Putting the pieces of our calculations together, we find that the relatedness between a
focal subordinate and the immature individual that receives its help is q0rˆ + q1rˆ + q2rˆ = rˆ.
Appendix C.4. The Inclusive-Fitness Effect of Helping
Weighting marginal fitness changes by the appropriate measures of reproductive value,
and the appropriate relatedness coefficients we find that the inclusive-fitness effect of subor-
dinate help is given by equation (2) in the main text.
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Table 1: Summary of notation used in the main text.
Symbol(s) Explanation
b Number of immature offspring produced on a territory during a given time
period, and interpreted as fecundity or birth rate.
c, cˆ Fraction of dominant vacancies per time period per territory that are con-
tested by related individuals. A hat denotes the equilibrium value of the
parameter.
h Subordinate helping rate.
mα, mˆα Number of local dominant vacancies secured by a subordinate. This param-
eter can also be interpreted as a probability. A hat denotes the equilibrium
value of the parameter.
mβ, mˆβ Likelihood that a subordinate does not compete successfully for a breeding
opportunity as a dominant. Of course, mβ = 1 − mα. A hat denotes the
equilibrium value of the parameter.
nα, nˆα Number of dominant vacancies secured by a disperser. A hat denotes the
equilibrium value of the parameter.
rˆ Genetic relatedness between two different individuals born on the same terri-
tory during the same time period, at equilibrium.
sα Survival rate of a dominant individual.
sβ, ∆sβ Survival rate of a subordinate, and the positive change in this rate following
receipt of help from a subordinate born in the previous time period.
sω, ∆sω Survival rate of a disperser, and the negative change in this rate following
donation of help to an individual born in the current time period.
vα Reproductive value of a dominant individual.
vβ Reproductive value of a subordinate individual, vβ = sωnˆαvα.
z The probability that an individual delays its dispersal from its natal territory
for one time period for the chance to compete to inherit a dominant position.
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